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 SUMMARY 
This paper analyses the evolution of wage inequality in Kenya between 1964 and 2000. Our 
measure of wage inequality is the ratio of wages in manufacturing to wages in agriculture, 
which can be seen as an indicator of sectoral wage-inequality or as a proxy for skilled to 
unskilled wages. We find that changes in relative wages have primarily been driven by the 
degree of openness, while other factors such as the capital-labor ratio, educational attainment, 
relative labor-productivity, and the ratio between agricultural and manufacturing prices had 
no significant effect. We conclude that international market integration has reduced wage-
inequality in Kenya. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
In recent years there has been extensive research on changes in wage inequality in response to 
rising global trade. Most studies have dealt with highly industrialized countries, but there have 
been a number of studies of less-industrialized Latin American and Asian countries as well 
(Williamson, 1997; Arbache, Dickerson & Green, 2004; Goldberg & Pavcnik, 2004). Due to 
lack of good data there have so far been few studies of African economies, but we have been 
able to analyze the impact of greater openness to trade on the evolution of wage-inequality in 
Kenya. 
 
Since poverty is more prevalent in Africa than in any other continent, it is particularly 
important to take the distributional impact of economic reforms into account. Not 
surprisingly, the debate about the impact of structural adjustment and trade-reforms on 
income-distribution in Africa has been heated. Sahn, Dorosh, and Younger (1996, p. 719) 
concluded on the basis of extensive empirical work1 that “in most countries, adjustment 
policies, when implemented and sustained, improve income distribution and do not adversely 
affect the poor". However, De Maio, Stewart, and van der Hoeven (1999), and others, have 
found evidence of increasing inequality in several countries. They argue that the distributional 
impact of reforms has often been negative, but it is hard to be sure about policy impacts 
without a counterfactual. We attempt in this paper to isolate the impact of trade-reform in 
Kenya during 1964-2000 on one aspect of inequality, wage-inequality, while controlling for 
other important determinants.   
  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a brief theoretical review. 
Section 3 then describes the evolution of the Kenyan labor market and introduces our wage-
series. Section 4 presents our data on changes in factor endowments in Kenya, while Section 5 
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provides information about the extent of international economic integration of Kenya during 
the period. Section 6 presents our econometric analysis of the determinants of wage inequality 
in Kenya and Section 7 discusses the compatibility of our results with those of Manda and 
Sen (2004), who looked the effects of trade liberalization on wages and employment in 
Kenya. Section 8 summarizes and draws conclusions. 
 
2. THEORY  
Most discussion of wage-inequality has been based on the standard Heckscher-Ohlin model, 
which says that a country tends to export goods that use its abundant factor intensively and 
import goods that use its scarce factor intensively (Leamer, 1995; Wood, 1997). However, in 
a simple 2-country, 2-factor (skilled and unskilled labor), 2-good model, barriers to trade 
drive wedges between the prices of the two goods in the two countries. The price of the 
unskilled labor-intensive exportable may be kept low in the less developed country, and vice 
versa for the industrialized country. A move from autarky to free trade, or from high tariffs to 
low tariffs, can then lead to increased production of unskilled-labor-intensive exportables in 
the poor country, which in turn leads to increased demand for unskilled labor and reduced 
demand for skilled labor. In accordance with the Stolper-Samuelson theorem, we would thus 
expect to see increased unskilled wages in Kenya in response to recent trade reforms. This 
result would not change fundamentally if we had more tradable goods (see Woods, 1997), 
although the magnitude of the effect of lower tariffs on wages might be smaller. 
 
The effect of introducing non-traded goods into the model will depend on the pattern of 
consumption substitution between traded and non-traded goods. If the poor country produces 
a non-traded good which uses unskilled labor intensively, and demand for this good is a close 
substitute for the more skill-intensive of the two traded goods, then opening up will reduce the 
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price and increase sales of the skill-intensive tradable. The resulting drop in demand for 
unskilled labor in non-tradables production could then be larger than the increase in demand 
for unskilled labor in the labor-intensive tradables sector. Thus it is theoretically possible 
(though not likely) that there would be a drop in unskilled wages. 
 
Adding another factor of production to the model might also complicate matters. If our poor 
country has an abundance of land it might have a comparative advantage in the production of 
a land-intensive tradable. Greater openness would then increase production of the land-
intensive tradable. If land is a complement to skilled labor in production, then this would 
increase the demand for skilled labor. This might lead to an unexpected result in terms of 
relative wages. In a poor LDC, however, land is probably complementary to unskilled labor, 
and thus introducing it into the analysis would not generate such results.  
 
If instead we added the factor capital to the model it would be more reasonable to assume that 
it is complementary to skilled labor. Assuming the less developed country does not have a 
comparative advantage in production of skill-intensive goods, this would not change our 
prediction for the effect on wage-inequality. Just as in our original model, we would expect to 
see increased unskilled wages in response to greater openness to trade.  
 
There is an abundance of evidence that exporting sectors in LDCs are generally less skill-
intensive than import-competing sectors (see survey in Wood, 1997). The evidence for 
African countries specifically is limited, but seems consistent. In accordance with the model 
outlined above and the Stolper-Samuelson theorem, unskilled wages should then increase 
relative to skilled wages when the economy opens up. 
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The standard Stolper-Samuelson effect is not the only one that can influence wage inequality. 
An alternative channel through which trade reforms can affect wage inequality is via changes 
in industry wage premiums. Goldberg and Pavcnik (2004) note that industrial wage-premiums 
account for a significant portion of wage-inequality in poor countries. If there are labor-
market rigidities hindering smooth reallocation of labor across sectors, this channel might be 
important. Sectoral adjustment to tariff-changes might then come via changes in wages rather 
than changes in employment. A tariff-cut in Kenya might therefore also in this case translate 
into a fall in the wage-premium in manufacturing. 
 
If there is imperfect competition in product and labor markets, profitable protected industries 
might have shared their rents with their employees, because of union power, for example. If 
reduced tariffs now force firms to accept lower mark-ups, manufacturing wages will be forced 
down as well via these lower industrial rents. There is substantial evidence (e.g. Harrison, 
1994) that mark-ups have in fact declined in response to trade liberalization. 
 
On the other hand, increased openness could lead to changes in the availability of technology 
or to productivity-improvements in industries exposed to stiffer competition. If the externally 
induced technological changes are skill-biased, or if productivity-gains are shared with 
workers, then lower tariffs might lead to higher wage-premiums, and a tariff reduction could 
increase the relative wages of skilled labor. Arbacha, Dickerson, and Green (2004) found that 
this happened in Brazil. However, Kenya has had very limited inflow of foreign direct 
investment or foreign technology, so this does not seem likely to have happened there (see 
Bigsten & Kimuyu, 2001). 
 
 6
To summarize, then, if tariffs are reduced in manufacturing in Kenya, we would expect a 
reduction in wage-inequality either because of the Stolper-Samuelson effect or if the lower 
tariffs reduce the rents in the previously protected sector. There could be a contrary effect if 
lower tariffs induced productivity-improvements in the previously protected sector, but we 
would not expect that effect to dominate in Kenya. Our presumption is thus that lower tariffs 
have reduced wage-inequality in Kenya. 
 
3. RELATIVE WAGES AND THE LABOR MARKET 
In this section we present data on wages for employees in manufacturing and agriculture used 
in the analysis, and describe the Kenyan labor market.  However, first we provide some basic 
facts about the role of manufacturing and agriculture in the development of the Kenyan 
economy. Table 1 shows that industry, including manufacturing, has grown six fold since 
independence, but at a slow rate in the 1990s, particularly during the period 1995-2000. The 
share of industry in value added has varied between 17% and 21% with a peak in 1979 and a 
dip in the mid-1990s, while manufacturing has made up around two thirds of the industrial 
sector. The share of agriculture was more or less constant at about 30% between 1970 and 
1995 but it fell somewhat in the late 1990s. Hence, overall there was not much structural 
transformation during the period under study. There also seems to been little structural change 
within the manufacturing sector; in a recent study openness and employment Sen (2004) fails 
to find significant increases in the efficiency of labor or shifts in industry-specific capital-
labor ratios.  
 
Table 1 here 
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Time series studies of wage inequality have been plagued by several problems. One is that it 
has been hard to get time-series data for a well-defined measure of wage-inequality. The 
Heckscher-Ohlin model discussed above would require data on skilled wages relative to 
unskilled wages, but such time series data by levels of education are not available in Kenya. 
We therefore choose to use manufacturing employees and agricultural employees as proxies 
for skill-categories. These groups are not homogenous, but agricultural workers certainly have 
lower education on average.  
 
Figure 1 shows our time series of relative wages in Kenya. From 1965, until the late 1970s, 
manufacturing wages were roughly four times as high as agricultural. During the 1980s and 
the beginning of the 1990s the ratio declined, and since 1994 it has been about 2.6 times. 
 
The wages series used are from the formal sector, which during the period covered 11% to 
13% of the labor force. Most of the remainder of the labor force were smallholders, but an 
increasing share was engaged in the non-agricultural informal sector. An interesting question 
is thus whether wages in agriculture also reflect wages in the informal sector. There is no 
systematic time-series evidence on informal sector wages in Kenya, but surveys from 1999 
show that average formal-sector income then was slightly more than twice that in the micro- 
and small-enterprise sector or the informal sector (Kenya, 1999). Since average wages in the 
formal sector are close to those in manufacturing, there is at least some correspondence 
between agricultural-sector wages and informal-sector wages. Hence, it is not unreasonable to 
assume that agricultural wages reflect the wider labor-market for less skilled workers. 
 
Figure 1 here 
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As Figure 1 shows, the gap between agricultural and non-agricultural wages increased rapidly 
during the1960s, largely because of a wage-policy aiming to increase urban formal-sector 
wages. With Independence in 1963, Kenya needed much more qualified manpower in the 
public sector, which increased its relative wages dramatically. As a consequence of this, 
private sector real wages also rose. 2 For skilled workers, the late 1960s were a period of rapid 
increases in earnings, but this trend reversed during the 1970s, when private sector real wages 
fell. Since then formal sector employment has grown very slowly relative to informal-sector 
employment. This may reflect wage-rigidities that keep wages above market-clearing levels in  
the formal sector, or economic advantages to conducting business in the informal sector 
(Bigsten, Kimuyu & Lundvall, 2004).3
 
Relative wages can also be affected by changes in labor-market regulation and institutions. 
Before independence formal-sector minimum wages were important, and increased rapidly 
until about 1968. Then the new government sought to control the trade union movement, and by 
the early 1970s many workers’ rights conceded by the colonial government had been 
circumscribed (Collier & Lal, 1986). Trade unions in Kenya were financially weak and their 
ability to strike was limited. Since the 1960s there have been a series of “tripartite agreements” 
between workers, employers, and government, in which employers pledged to increase 
employment by a certain percentage if workers refrained from demanding wage-increments over 
a given period. An industrial court was also established to help resolve disputes between 
organized labor and employers, including implementation of the government’s wage-guidelines. 
 
Labor-market reforms started as part of the structural-adjustment efforts in the 1980s and 
became more extensive in the 1990s. In 1994 it became much easier for employees to 
negotiate wage increases, as trade unions were allowed to seek full compensation for price 
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increases without being hindered by wage-guidelines (Manda & Sen, 2004). At the same time 
redundancy laws were amended, which made it easier for employers to lay off employees. 
These reforms meant that market forces generated rapid wage increases during the 1995-2000 
period (see IMF, 2003 for details). 
 
4. THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC INTEGRATION OF KENYA 
We are exploring how changes in international economic integration have affected factor-
rewards in Kenya. International factor mobility has been limited,4 so the link to the world 
market has essentially come via goods prices.  
 
Kenya inherited a policy of import substitution from the colonial government, but from about 
1967 it was pursued more vigorously. This was particularly the case after the foreign-
exchange crisis of 1971 when the government chose to introduce strict import-controls rather 
than to devalue and undertake macroeconomic adjustment. This policy was temporarily 
relaxed in 1976, when the coffee boom led to a massive inflow of foreign exchange. The 
boom lasted just a few years, but as coffee prices came down and oil prices shot up in 1979 
the government was forced to embark on a policy of structural adjustment, including trade-
liberalization.5 In November 1981 the government stopped requiring “no-objection 
certificates” from domestic producers,6 gradually replacing quantitative restrictions with 
equivalent tariffs, followed by tariff-reductions and rationalizations. Macroeconomic 
problems made the government halt some of the reforms in 1982, but the reform process 
started slowly again in 1983. The reforms gathered pace in 1987-88, and this time they were 
more successful. Between then and 1997-98 maximum tariffs were reduced from 170% to 
25%, and the number of tariff bands reduced from 24 to 4; the average tariff fell from 49% to 
17% (O’Brien & Ryan, 2001). Import-licensing schedules were abandoned in 1993, and in 
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1993-94 virtually all current and capital account transactions were fully liberalized. This is 
also the year in which Kenya was classified as “open” according to Sachs and Warner (1995). 
Although Kenya remained an open economy during the latter half of the 1990s, several 
factors such as loose macroeconomic policy, macroeconomic instability, and the collapse of 
the IMF-program in 1997, set in motion a process which led to an appreciating real exchange 
rate, that is, a process that resembles reduced openness. 
 
For our empirical analysis we had to come up with an estimate of the extent of international 
economic integration or liberalization. Standard measures of openness to trade are the average 
tariff-rate and the coverage-ratio for non-tariff barriers. To use this measure we would also 
need a consistent time-series of import tariffs, which we do not have, although we have data 
from the mid-1970s on tariffs collected as a share of imports (World Bank, 2005).7 Besides 
only covering part of the study-period, this is a very imperfect indicator of the level of 
protection. The tariff-average tends to under-estimate the impact of the high tariff-rates, 
because the corresponding import-levels are low. And the actual tariff rates on the books were 
higher than what this measure shows, but some importers could get their import-taxes waived. 
Moreover, there were major quantitative restrictions on imports, which obviously had an 
effect on domestic prices, though no tariff revenue was collected. 
 
Since we did not have tariff-data for the whole period, or adequate information on quantitative 
restrictions, we instead looked for price-data reflecting changes in the degree of protection. A 
possible indicator would be relative prices between manufacturing and agricultural goods in 
Kenya, but commodity-booms and weather conditions have had strong effects on agricultural 
prices, obscuring the impact of relative price changes due to long-term international market-
integration. Consequently we chose to measure the impact of trade-policy reform by 
 11
comparing the change of Kenyan market prices of manufactured goods with the change of 
world market-prices of manufactured goods (converted to Kenya Shillings using the official 
exchange-rate).8 Presumably opening up reduces domestic manufacturing prices relative to 
world prices, since the whole point of the import-substitution policy was to keep 
manufacturing prices above world market prices to make it possible for domestic producers to 
enter the market. We used the GDP deflator for manufacturing in Kenya, and the price index 
for industrial production in the UK, the latter being a major trading-partner.9 The resulting 
time-series is shown in Figure 2. 
Figure 2 here 
 
Our indicator of trade-reform coincides with the general description above of the Kenyan 
experience. Protection increased from Independence until 1975; the coffee-boom in 1976 led 
to opening up; there was a reversal in the beginning of the 1980s and then further reform; and 
by 1993 Kenya was an open economy. During the latter half of the 1990s there were some 
setbacks after macroeconomic prudence was thrown aside in the run-up to the 1997 election.   
 
International trade seems to have responded to these policy changes as expected. During the 
first half of the 1980s, there was a decline in manufactured exports, partly due to global 
recession. However, between 1985 and 1990 the real US$ export value grew by 54%, and 
between 1990 and 1995 it grew by 114%.10 The second half of the 1990s saw a decline in 
manufactured exports by 27%, probably as a result of the impact of the Asian crisis and 
exchange rate appreciation; the real effective exchange rate increased by about 40% from 
1993/4 to the late 1990s.11
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5. CHANGES IN FACTOR ENDOWMENTS 
Since factor abundance is a basic determinant of the pattern of specialisation and factor-prices 
in an economy, we included endowment-ratios in the analysis. Figure 3 shows changes in the 
capital-labor ratio, land-labor ratio, and capital-land ratio for the period 1964-2000. The 
estimate of capital stock relies on assumptions about depreciation rates, but we would argue 
that the estimates of factor-availability are reasonably reliable. 
 
Since Kenya has seen a rapid increase in labor throughout the period while the amount of 
arable land has changed very little, there has been a continuous decrease in the land-labor 
ratio.  The capital-labor ratio increased until 1982, but then the trend was reversed. 
 
Figure 3 here 
 
We hypothesize that capital and skilled labor are complements so that an increase in the 
capital-labor ratio will lead to higher demand for skilled workers and thus increase wage-
inequality. Similarly we hypothesize that land and unskilled labor are complements, which 
means that increased demand for land would reduce wage-inequality. Increased supply of 
educated workers would tend to hold skilled wages down.  
 
Educational attainment has also changed during the period of analysis, which could be a 
problem since the skill-composition of employees in both agriculture and manufacturing is 
likely to have changed, as more and more of the labor-force have more education. For 
example, in manufacturing the share of employees with at least secondary education went 
from 36% in 1978 to 61% in 2000 (Manda & Sen, 2004, p. 38).  
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Since it is possible that the average educational level has increased more in manufacturing 
than in agriculture, we added a variable in our regressions to at least partially control for this.  
However, there are no time series available on the educational attainments specifically in 
agriculture and industry so we used the ratio of those over 15 who at least have initiated 
secondary school to all those over 15 (Figure 4). The data on educational attainment was 
taken from the database of Barro and Lee (2000). There are only observations for every fifth 
year (1965, 1970, and so on) so the series was interpolated to a smooth trend. The trend-
increase is only broken by a decline in the 1980s.  
 
Figure 4 here 
 
6.  REGRESSION RESULTS 
We are now ready to look at how globalization, that is, trade-policy reform, has affected 
relative wages in Kenya. Our focus will be mainly on the explanatory power of the changes in 
the ratio between Kenyan and UK manufacturing prices. However, several other variables 
might also have affected relative wages, so we analyzed the roles of the Kenyan capital-labor 
and labor-land ratios, levels of education, and relative labor-productivity in agriculture and 
manufacturing. We also included the alternative to our preferred measure of economic 
integration, the relative price of agricultural and manufacturing goods in Kenya; and to 
capture short-run dynamics, we tested changes in terms of trade, the price of coffee beans and 
the exchange rate. 
 
Before reviewing the results from the empirical analysis it may be helpful to see a plot of the 
two variables of major interest, the logs of relative wages and of Kenya/UK relative 
manufacturing prices, denoted wmwa and rpm, respectively (see Figure 5). The ratio of 
Kenyan manufacturing to agricultural wages fell substantially in the late 1970s, probably due 
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to a rise in agricultural wages as a result of the 1975-78 coffee boom. The ratio then fell 
further in response to the liberalization process started in the early 1980s.12 Kenya/UK 
relative manufacturing prices followed a similar pattern, although they rose quickly during the 
latter half of the 1990s. 
Figure 5 here 
 
 
Since both series are clearly non-stationary and our main interest was in the long-run 
relationships between the variables, we first used the Johansen (1988, 1995) approach to test 
for integration and cointegration between wawm and all the other variables. After that, to 
highlight the adjustment to long-run equilibrium as well as short-run dynamics, a model was 
estimated with stationary variables. Because of the small number of observations and the 
intractability of testing for cointegration with many variables at the same time, we did the 
cointegration analysis for groups of variables. There did not appear to be cointegration 
between wawm and any of the other variables, or combinations of them, except rpm.13 Since 
the cointegration-tests produced a lot of output we only report these latter results; the other 
results can be obtained from the authors upon request. However, we report results from tests 
of the short-run impact of all the variables in Table 5.  
 
To test for cointegration, we first estimated a vector autoregression (VAR) for the period 
1966-2000, with two lags on wmwa and rpm and an impulse dummy for 1993. The dummy 
captures a sharp drop in rpm that year due to a major devaluation. The F-test on model-
reduction, reported in Table 2, indicates that the longest lag could be removed; one lag 
seemed sufficient to capture the dynamics. This result is supported by the decline in the value 
of the Schwartz criteria. Table 2 also reports multivariate misspecification tests for the model 
with one lag. The tests for serial correlation (AR 1-2 test), heteroscedasticity and normality 
are all insignificant. 
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 Table 2 here 
 
Table 3 reports the trace-tests for cointegration, the eigenvalues of the long-run matrix, the 
characteristic roots of the companion matrix, the cointegrating vectors (β), and feedback 
coefficients (α). Since the trace-test relies on asymptotic distributions, and we have few 
observations, it is only indicative of the number of cointegrating relations; other sources of 
information should also be used to determine the number of stationary relations (see Hendry 
and Juselius, 2001).  
Table 3 here 
 
According to the trace tests there is one cointegrating vector; the test-statistic for the null 
hypothesis of a rank of zero, r=0, is significant at the 99% level, while the null of a rank of 
one, r=1, is insignificant. The eigenvalues support this result; the first one is clearly larger 
than zero (0.40), while the second is close to zero (0.06). The presence of one cointegrating 
vector is also evident from the roots of the companion matrix of the long-run matrix; one is 
close to unity (0.94), while the other is 0.35. This is also the case with the feedback 
coefficients, which are high in the first vector but very low in the second.  
 
The next step was to identify the cointegrating vector. We started by testing whether either of 
the two variables was stationary by itself, that is, whether one variable could be excluded 
from the cointegrating vector. Then we tested for weak exogeneity. Since we expected rpm to 
determine wmwa in the long run, our model would not be valid if wmwa were weakly 
exogenous. Table 4 shows that both variables were nonstationary and neither could be 
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excluded, and that rpm was weakly exogenous. This means that wmwa adjusts to changes in 
rpm in the long run.  
Table 4 here 
 
The cointegrating vector, is plotted in Figure 6. It shows the 
deviations from the long-run equilibrium relation between wmwa and rpm. 
   -  0.35 ,CI wmwa rpm=
 
Figure 6 here 
 
 
Next we estimated a general error correction model (ECM) with one lag of each variable, plus 
the rate of change of world coffee prices measured in constant Kenyan Shilling (Δpcoff); 
initially we also included several other variables but they proved to be insignificant.14 Table 
A1 in the Appendix reports the general ECM and diagnostic tests, which are all insignificant. 
After removing variables with insignificant coefficients we obtained the preferred model,  
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The coefficient standard errors are shown in parentheses; Δ denotes the first difference, σˆ is 
the residual standard deviation and T is the sample period. The diagnostic tests are against 
serial correlation of order 2, FAR, autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity of order 1, 
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FARCH, heteroscedasticity, FHet, non-normality, 2 ,Normχ and non-linearity, FRESET (see Hendry 
and Doornik, 2001, for details). 
 
According to this model, our measure of openness (rpm) determines relative wages in the long 
run; an increase in openness reduces wmwa, thus reducing wage-inequality. The t-value for 
the error-correction term is  -4.8, and the speed of adjustment towards equilibrium is fairly 
rapid; 0.58 of a deviation from long-run equilibrium is corrected within a year. The rate of 
change in relative wages is also affected by coffee prices, though its t-value is only close to 2. 
An increase in coffee prices increases manufacturing wages relative to agricultural the 
following year. The positive coefficient is probably due to indirect effects of increased export 
incomes. 15 Changes in terms of trade and coffee prices have a correlation coefficient of 0.7, 
catching the same effect, but only the coffee-price variable has a t-value close to 2. 
 
Table 5 shows results from diagnostic tests on omitted variables. It reports F-statistics from 
Lagrange multiplier tests for adding a variable to Equation (1), showing that none of the 
omitted variables was significant. The variables are the log-differences of the relative price of 
Kenyan agricultural and manufacturing goods, Δpmpa, the exchange rate, Δe, terms of trade, 
Δtot, coffee prices in US dollars, ΔpcoffUS, a measure of educational attainment, Δeduc, 
relative labor-productivity in agriculture and manufacturing, Δrelprod,  and the capital-labor 
ratio in first and second difference, Δcaplab and ΔΔcaplab, and the land-labor ratio, Δlanlab.  
 
Table 5 here 
 
The model’s empirical constancy was assessed for the period 1978 to 2000 using recursive 
estimation. The output from this exercise is summarized in the graphs in Figure 7 below, 
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showing recursive estimates of the four coefficients with ± 2 standard errors; One-step 
residuals with ± 2 estimated standard errors; and sequences of One-step, break-point (N-step 
down) and forecast-Chow (N-step up) test-statistics. The latter are scaled such that the straight 
line at unity matches the 5% significance level. The coefficients are quite stable, there are no 
outliers, and none of the test-statistics of the three Chow tests are significant at the 5% level. 
Hence, the model appears to be stable. 
 
Figure 7 here 
 
7. DISCUSSION 
The only other study  dealing with changes in wage-income inequality in Kenya is, to our 
knowledge, Manda and Sen (2004). They look at wage differences between skilled and 
unskilled workers in manufacturing using firm level data for 1995 and 2000 and estimates 
based labor force survey data for 1978 and 1986 (from an earlier study by Appleton, Bigsten 
and Manda, 1999). They conclude (p. 42) that “less skilled workers experienced losses in 
earnings during the period 1986-2000, along with an increase in inequality between highly 
skilled and less skilled workers”. This conclusion is based on Table 10 in their article, which 
we have recast in index-form to better see what has happened over time (see Table 6). 
 
Table 6 here 
 
 In the samples, reported in Table 6 in Manda and Sen (2004), the share of those with no 
education falls from 15% to 2% during the period of analysis, which means that comparisons 
using estimates for this category are really not meaningful. Moreover, the share of those with 
university education is very small; it goes from 3 to 4%. It is thus mainly the groups with 
primary and secondary education that can be reliably compared; the share of those with 
 19
primary school falls from 46% to 33%, while the share of those with secondary school 
increases from 36% to 61%. 
 
If we look at the  period from 1978 to 2000 we see that those with primary education did 
better than those with secondary education, and that during the period 1978-1986 those with 
primary education did clearly better. Furthermore, in the period 1986-1995 only those with 1-
2 years of secondary education did better than those with primary education, while in the final 
period, 1995-2000, two of the secondary education categories did better than the primary 
education ones. Since our measure of wage inequality declined until 1994, when there was a 
reversal, this seems to be consistent with the data presented by Manda and Sen. Their 
conclusion that globalisation in Kenya has been associated with increasing wage inequality is 
therefore debatable. We would argue that the surge in skilled wages in the late 1990s was not 
due to trade liberalisation; our indicator shows a reduction in openness during this period, so 
the increase in relative skilled wages is what the theory predicts. Yet  this effect alone is 
unlikely to be strong enough to explain the rapid increase in skilled wages. The  deregulation 
of the labor market in 1994 probably played a considerble role, making it possible for the 
more skilled workers to bounce back and reclaim some of the losses in relative income that 
they had experienced since the 1970s (see IMF, 2003). 
   
8. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
We have analysed how relative wages in Kenya have been affected by changes in the the 
degree of international economic integration, as well as by a range of other factors. In spite of 
having few observations, the results are strong. We find evidence that openness, measured by 
the ratio between manufacturing prices in Kenya and international industrial prices proxied by 
those in the UK, Kenya’s main trading partner, played a major role in determining relative 
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wages during the period 1964-2000. Of those included in the analysis, the only other variables 
that influenced relative wages was the world coffee price measured in constant Kenyan 
Shilling, but it had only a short-run effect. Our results thus indicate that liberalization has 
reduced wage-inequality in Kenya.  
 
There was a rapid increase in skilled wages in the second half of the 1990s, which appears to 
contradict this conclusion. However, the degree of openness peaked in 1993/1994 according 
to our measure, and during the latter half of the decade several factors contributed to relative 
price changes that indicated reduced openness. For example, at the end of the 1990s the real 
effective exchange rate was about 40% higher than in the beginning of the decade. Moreover, 
extensive liberalization of the labor market in 1994 appears to have generated rapid growth in 
real manufacturing wages, probably due to increased bargaining power of the labor unions. 
Yet, the mechanisms behind the development of real and relative wages since the mid-1990s 
are not well understood and merit further research. 
 
In a recent study Manda and Sen (2004) argue that wage-inequality in Kenya increased as a 
result of trade liberalization. However, a close scrutiny of their data reveals that this 
conclusion is questionable. The increase in wage-inequality occurred mainly during the period 
1995-2000, while there was strong decrease in wage-equality between 1978 and 2000.  
 
Our results thus suggests that the reduction of protection of the manufacturing sector led to a 
fall in the ratio of wages in manufacturing to wages in agriculture, which can be seen as an 
indicator of sectoral wage-inequality or as proxy for skilled to unskilled wages. Globalization 
or opening up to trade seems to have reduced wage-inequality in Kenya. 
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Table 1. Kenyan industrial production, export, and formal employment 1964-2000 
Year Index of 
industrial 
production 
(constant 
Kshs) 
Index of 
manufac-
turing 
production 
(constant 
Kshs) 
Index of 
agricultural 
production 
(constant 
Kshs) 
Percentage 
share of 
industry in 
GDP 
Percentage 
share of 
manufacturi
ng in GDP 
Percentage 
share of 
agriculture 
in GDP 
Percentage 
share of 
labor force 
in formal 
employment 
1964 100 100 100 16.7 10.4 41.5 12.2 
1970 135.8 137.6 118.3 19.8 12.0 33.3 11.6 
1975 274.6 285.2 164.8 20.3 12.0 34.2 12.5 
1980 372.2 416.0 199.0 20.9 12.8 32.6 12.8 
1985 427.6 501.9 231.4 19.1 11.7 32.5 12.5 
1990 548.2 663.1 284.9 19.1 11.8 29.1 12.7 
1995 593.9 750.8 285.7 16.0 9.9 31.1 11.7 
2000 633.7 801.2 304.6 18.6 12.9 19.7 10.9 
Sources: Data for industry and manufacturing and manufacturing export from World Bank (2005), and data for 
labor from Statistical Abstract, various years (Kenya, annual). 
 
 
 
 
Table 2. Misspecification tests, test of reduction from VAR(2) 
to VAR(1) 
Multivariate tests:    
AR 1-2 test F(8,54) = 0.573 [0.79] 
Normality test χ²(4 ) = 6.170 [0.19] 
Hetero test F(12,66) =0.818 [0.63] 
Hetero-X test F(15,66) = 1.23 [0.27] 
Schwartz criteria two lags one lag  
 -3.568 -3.794  
Test of model reduction, 2 lags to 1: F(4,58) = 1.36 [0.26]   
Note: p-values are reported in brackets. The estimation period is 1966-2000.  
The vector autoregression includes an impulse dummy set to unity in 1993. 
A description of the tests can be found in Hendry and Doornik (2001). 
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Table 3. Cointegration analysis, 1965 - 2000 
 
Eigenvalue of Π-matrix 
 
0.40 
 
0.06 
Null hypothesis r = 0 r = 1 
Trace test 20.64 2.20 
p-value for Trace test 0.007 0.138 
Roots of process 0.95 0.35 
 
Variable 
 
wmwa 
 
Rpm 
 β/1
 
1.000 -0.347 
β/2 106.4 1.00 
α1 -0.5763 0.3157 α2 -0.0001 -0.0014 
Note: The vector autoregression includes one lag on 
wmwa and rpm, and an impulse dummy set to unity in 
1993. Critical values for the trace tests are based on the 
asymptotic distributions for an unrestricted constant.  
 
 
 
 
Table 4. Cointegrated VAR and tests of significance 
and weak exogeneity 
 
Standardized eigenvector 
 
Variable 
 
wmwa 
 
rpm 
 β’ 1.00 -0.35 
 
Standard error - 0.024 
 
Standardized adjustment coefficients 
α’ -0.58 0.31 
Standard error -0.13 0.34 
 
Statistics for test of significance and stationarity 
 
 
 
wmwa 
 
rpm 
χ²(1 )   14.90** 16.25** 
 
Weak exogeneity test statistics 
 
 
 
wmwa 
 
rpm 
χ²(1 )   15.65** 0.83 
Note: Two asterisks indicate significance at the 1% level. 
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    Table 5. Diagnostic tests for omitted variables, 1966 -2000  
 Variables                            F-tests 
Δpmpat Δpmpat-1 F(2,29) =  0.24 [0.79] 
Δet Δet-1 F(2,29) =  0.17 [0.84] 
Δtott Δtott-1 F(2,29) =  1.23 [0.31] 
ΔpcoffUSt ΔpcoffpUSt-1 F(2,29) = 0.45 [0.64] 
Δeduct Δeduct-1 F(2,29) =  0.51 [0.61] 
Δrelprodt Δrelprodt-1 F(2,29) =  0.09 [0.90] 
Δcaplabt Δcaplabt-1 F(2,29) = 0.28 [0.76] 
ΔΔcaplabt ΔΔcaplabt-1 F(2,28) = 0.10 [0.90]a
Δlanlabt Δlanlabt-1 F(2,29) = 0.13 [0.87] 
a) The sample is 1967-2000. 
 
Note: p-values are given in brackets. A Δ denotes first difference and ΔΔ 
second difference. All variables are in logs. papm is the ratio of prices of 
agricultural and manufacturing goods; e is the nominal exchange-rate; tot is 
terms of trade; pcoffUS is the world price of coffee beans; educ is a 
educational attainment; relprod is the relative labor productivity between 
agriculture and manufacturing; caplab is the capital-labor ratio; and lanlab 
is the land-labor ratio. 
 
 
 
Table 6. Indexes of real earnings in manufacturing by education level 1978-2000 
Education 1978 1986 1995 2000
Uneducated 100 124.0 88.5 34.9
Primary 1-4 100 112.7 77.2 79.3
Primary 5-8 100 90.0 64.0 72.0
Secondary 1-2 100 83.2 63.8 61.8
Secondary 3-4 100 59.6 38.7 48.2
Secondary 5-6 100 91.1 26.8 61.1
University 100 95.2 52.7 88.3
Source: Computed from Table 10 in Manda and Sen (2004) 
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     Table A1: General error correction model, 1966 - 2000 
 Coefficient SE t-value 
Constant 0.533 0.182 2.930 
Δwmwgt-1 0.102 0.158 0.648 
Δrpmt 0.008 0.060 0.128 
Δrpmt-1 0.050 0.089 0.564 
Δpcofft 0.025 0.031 0.804 
Δpcoffpt-1 0.048 0.025 1.880 
[wmwa-0.35rpm]t-1 -0.549 0.185 -2.970 
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 Figure 1. Manufacturing wages relative to agricultural wages, 1964-2000. Source: Kenya 
(annual). 
 
 
Figure 2: Ratio of Kenyan to UK manufacturing price indexes, 1964-2000 (1995 = 1). Source: 
Ryan (2002) and IMF (2004). 
 
 
 
Capital-labor ratio_______    Land-labor rati+−−+−−+  Capital-land ratio = □−−□−−□ .
Figure 3: Relative factor-endowments in Kenya, 1964-2000. The variables have been mean- 
and variance-adjusted to increase readability of the graph. Sources: The capital-stock series is 
from Ryan (2002), while labor and arable land are from World Bank (2005). 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Changes in educational attainment, 1964-2000. The percentage of those over 15 
who had at least started secondary education. Source: Barro and Lee (2000) 
 
 
 
wmwa  ______        rpm  •−−•−−•.  
Figure 5: The logs of the ratios between Kenyan manufacturing and agricultural wages 
(wmwa), and between Kenya and UK manufacturing prices (rpm), 1964-2000. rpm has been 
mean- and variance-adjusted. Sources: wmwa is from Kenya (annual); wm is wages for 
employees in the manufacturing sector and wa is wages for farm workers in the private sector; 
rpm was calculated from the GDP deflator for manufacturing in Kenya, taken from Ryan 
(2002), and industrial prices for the UK obtained from IMF (2004).  
 
 
 
Figure 6: The cointegrating vector, 1964-2000. 
 
   
Figure 7: Recursive estimates of the coefficients with ± 2 standard error (top four graphs), 
one-step residual with ± 2 estimated standard errors, One-step, N-step down (break-point) and 
N-step up (forecast) Chow statistics scaled with their 5% critical values. The straight line at 
unity shows the 5% critical level. See Hendry and Doornik (2001) for detailed description of 
the tests. 
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APPENDIX: GENERAL ERROR CORRECTION MODEL 
 
 
Table A1 here 
  
2
2
ˆ0.47;  0.047; 1966 - 2000; (2, 26) 0.704 [0.50];
 (1, 26) 0.752 [0.39]; (12,15) 1.29 [0.32]; (2) 2.47 [0.29];  
(1, 27) 1.32 [0.26]. 
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NOTES 
                                                 
1 There is a comprehensive presentation of the results in Sahn, Dorosh, and Younger (1997).   
2 Between 1963 and 1965 public sector real wages increased by 48%, while real wages increased by merely 6% 
in the private sector (Collier, Lal, 1986, p. 62). 
3 Real wages in the formal sector have recently been increasing rapidly, which suggests that the market is not 
reacting to the supply pressure. During 1998-2000 real earnings in the formal sector increased by 22.2%, 14.2% 
and 5.5% respectively (Kenya, 2001, p. 56). It thus seems as if workers in the informal sector cannot underbid 
those in the formal sector. 
4 For example, inward FDI during the period 1981-1989 was in the range of 1% to 3% of total investment 
(Manda & Sen, 2004, p. 32). 
5 Glenday and Ryan (2003) discuss the stages economic liberalization in Kenya and the links between trade 
liberalization and economic growth.   
6 Domestic producers of specific products could object to import of competing goods.  
7 Export taxes have not been very important in the case of Kenya. 
8 A similar measure was used by Athukorala and Rajapatirana (2000) for an analysis of the Sri Lankan 
experience. 
9 In principle a trade-weighted index would be the best measure. However, annual revisions of the trade weights 
would create abrupt changes in the index due to the high level of time aggregation. The major alternative to the 
UK price index is the one for the US, but we preferred to use the UK price index since the UK is Kenya’s major 
trading partner; imports from the UK  in 2000 were 2.5 times those from the US,  and exports to the UK were 6.6 
times those to the US  (Kenya, 2003). We also calculated the index with prices from some other countries but the 
overall pattern was the same.  
10 The data on exports of manufactured goods are from World Bank (2004). The U.S. price index on producer 
goods was used to calculate the real values. The series was obtained from IMF (2004)   
11 The real effective exchange rate was taken from IMF (2004) 
12  It is very hard to find data on inequality in Kenya that is comparable over time. The WIDER (2005) data on 
household inequality give Gini-coefficients for incomes in 1977 at 57.0, and for consumption in 1992 at 56.9, in 
1994 at 44.3, and in 1997 at 44.5. These estimates do not contradict our results. 
13 The land-labor ratio comes out significant in some specifications. It has a downward trend coinciding with that 
of wmwa over the period 1977-1993 but not before or after. Assuming that lanlab and wmwa cointegrate, and 
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adding a linear combination of the two variables to the error correction model reported in Equation (1), does not 
alter the interpretation our results, though the absolute value of some coefficients becomes lower. 
14 We report the attempts to add other variables to the error correction model in the form omitted-variables tests, 
see Table 5 below. 
15 The study of the coffee-boom of 1975-1978 by Bevan et al. (1990) showed that over time much of the effect of 
the boom spread to the urban areas. It is noted (p. 205) that “in spite of the decision of the Kenyan government to 
pass the coffee prices intact on to farmers the bulk of the income gain does not accrue to them. More than 75% 
of the boom income eventually ends up in the hands of urban households, a group that forms a small proportion 
of the population.” This clearly supports our argument for the sign of the coefficient.  
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